For the past five years, FLEOA has repeatedly called for qualified law enforcement leadership within TSA, because of repeated failures under the previous and current TSA Leadership Team. TSA continues to operate today as it has for many years with only one experienced law enforcement person on its leadership team, Robert Bray, the Director of the Federal Air Marshals Service. Unfortunately, Director Bray has very little input into the day to day operations of TSA. The sudden withdrawal of TSA Administrator Nominee Erroll Southers, a qualified law enforcement leader, was a setback for TSA and the security of the flying public.
Lewisberry, PA (PRWEB) February 11, 2010 -- Today, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA) President Jon Adler has called for new leadership in TSA and a major overhaul of the agency.
For the past five years, FLEOA has repeatedly called for qualified law enforcement leadership within TSA, because of repeated failures under the previous and current TSA Leadership Team. TSA continues to operate today as it has for many years with only one experienced law enforcement person on its leadership team, Robert Bray, the Director of the Federal Air Marshals Service. Unfortunately, Director Bray has very little input into the day to day operations of TSA. The sudden withdrawal of TSA Administrator Nominee Erroll Southers, a qualified law enforcement leader, was a setback for TSA and the security of the flying public.
FLEOA hope that Congress and the Administration will now remain focused on the TSA leadership void and the need to better fund the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).
TSA has experienced numerous serious failures over the past few years. Their inflexible allegiance to a failed, prevent-defense operation has left our planes vulnerable. Somehow, the TSA leadership’s idea of proactive security measures is to discipline an employee for making a mistake within a failed system. Alternatively, the SA leadership continues to minimize the importance of the law enforcement role played by our Assistant Federal Security Directors for Law Enforcement. Additionally, their skewed priorities have them more focused on uniforms then the operational needs of the FAMS.
Here are some of the glaring examples of the operational deficiencies within TSA that were well documented in major news stories both televised and in print:
In 2006, TSA exposed its own undercover bomb tests by sending an email to employees telling them about the tests. In 2007, TSA lost a portable hard drive containing personnel information of 100,000 TSA employees, including social security numbers and bank account information; TSA failed to discover fake bombs and bomb components 75% of the time at Los Angeles International Airport and 60% of the time at Chicago O’Hare Airport; TSA failed to discover that an individual had smuggled 14 firearms on-board an aircraft at Orlando International Airport, TSA failed to keep the sterile area of Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport secure between midnight and 4:30AM for several weeks until it was exposed by the local news media. In 2008, TSA could not account for hundreds of TSA uniforms and Identification cards according to a GAO Report.
In 2009, TSA posted its 93 page Screening Manual SOP containing Sensitive Security Information on the internet for nine months where everyone in the world was able to read it, before the news media discovered this precarious mistake. TSA also issued a press release providing information to the public on the new firearms to be carried by Federal Air Marshals who work covertly and anonymously causing safety concerns for the FAMS.
According to news media reports, TSA had previously certified the security screening at Muhammed International Airport, prior to terror suspect Abdulmutabllab boarding an aircraft at this airport on Christmas Day with a bomb concealed in his underwear. TSA had certified that the security screening at this airport met their standards.
During the first month of 2010, at Newark Liberty Airport, a non-screened individual entered the sterile area of the airport causing a massive evacuation, utter chaos for thousands of people and a six hour delay of flights costing the airlines millions of dollars. To compound the problem, TSA then realized that the security cameras were not working properly at the time of the incident and therefore TSA could not readily identify the individual that caused the breach. This same month, an unidentified suspect entered an employee door to a secure area at LaGuardia Airport and was not located. While the suspect apparently remains at large, this caused serious delays at the airport and heightened air travel anxiety.
In Bozeman, Montana, an individual went through TSA security screening with a firearm in his carryon bag; TSA never discovered the firearm and the person boarded the aircraft with a loaded gun. In Milwaukee, an individual went through TSA security screening with several shotgun shells in his carry-on bag; TSA never discovered the shotgun shells and the person boarded the aircraft with ammunition in his possession.
These incidents all occurred after the failed Christmas Day bombing attempt when TSA has presumably ramped up its security. Security experts from Israel’s El Al airline continue to offer valuable advice to TSA leadership, but they continue to ignore it.
It is understanding of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association that TSA continues to have a very high failure rate during covert testing of their screeners at many airports in the country. This is unacceptable. Failure is not an option. Over the past several years, under the current leadership team, TSA dismantled its office of law enforcement, terminated many highly experienced criminal investigators, turned the screeners into security officers with the stroke of a pen and no additional training, diluted the screener workforce by assigning many other duties to screeners, wasted hundreds of millions of dollars on worthless equipment and fancy new screener uniforms and continues to fail at its primary task of screening passengers at airports and protecting the flying public.
The Transportation Security Administration is an extremely large Federal agency (over 50,000 employees) responsible for the security of our nation’s transportation infrastructure with no law enforcement leadership and a very small law enforcement component that continues to be eroded. Yet somehow, the current TSA leadership is content to minimize the importance FAMS by placing them on the fourth level of their organizational chart.
The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association maintains that TSA’s continual failures will only increase our vulnerability unless there are concerted efforts to effect immediate change among the leadership ranks of this agency. A positive first step would be to immediately appoint Federal Air Marshal Director Robert Bray, as the Acting Administrator of TSA.
See Also:
- McLaren Software Extends the Reach of Asset Document Management Processes
- Attorneys - Help Consumers Avoid or Stop Foreclosures; What You Need To Know At A Minimum
- Expert Reveals How to Take the Stress Out of Replacing Chinese Drywall
- KPA and TK Carsites offer HR, OSHA and Internet Marketing Workshops at the NADA Convention and Expo 2010
- Implications of the New Australian Skilled Work Visa Policies – Migration Expert
[Via Legal / Law]
generic medications | buy kamagra uk | cialis super active+ 20mg pills
No comments:
Post a Comment